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This study of the functioning of 
the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme between 
February 2006 and July 2009 in 
Birbhum district, West Bengal 
reveals that in order to serve as 
an effective “employer of last 
resort”, the programme should 
provide proportionately more  
job-days during the agricultural 
lean season and wages should be 
paid in a timely manner. 
One of the four goals of the Natio-nal Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is the provision of a 
“strong social safety net for the vulnerable 
groups by providing a fall-back employ-
ment source, when other employment 
a lternatives are scarce or inadequate” 
(MoRD 2008: 1). Several papers have ex-
amined pertinent aspects of the function-
ing of the programme, such as targeting 
(Jha et al 2009), its impact on consump-
tion (Ravi and Engler 2009), and its per-
formance in terms of implementation 
(Bhatia and Dreze 2006; Ambasta et al 
2008; IAMR 2008). This article is motiva-
ted by the goal stated above and is 
c oncerned with examining whether the 
employment guarantee scheme serves as 
a social safety net by providing a source of 
employment when other alternatives are 
limited. In particular, to serve as an effec-
tive “employer of last resort”, the pro-
gramme should be providing (1) propor-
tionately more job-days during the agri-
cultural lean season, and (2) wages should 
be paid in a timely manner. Accordingly, 
this article focuses on whether these con-
ditions are being met and at the same time 
comments on other aspects of the func-
tioning of the NREGA in West Bengal’s 
Birbhum district. 
While publicly available statistics1 show 
the large gap between the number of em-
ployment days generated and the legally 
mandated threshold in West Bengal, this 
article goes beyond such comparisons by 
analysing the timing of job-creation over 
the year. Similarly, while several papers 
(Bhatia and Dreze 2006; Ambasta et al 
2008) have commented on the delays in 
wage payments, we go beyond noting 
such delays by explicitly identifying the 
time lag between commencement of 
work and payment of wages and pin-
pointing the source of delay in the wage 
p ayment chain.
Birbhum was amongst the 200 districts 
included in the first phase of the imple-
mentation of the employment guarantee 
scheme and for the most part, our analysis 
covers the period from February 2006 to 
July 2009. The empirical analysis report-
ed here is based on the secondary data 
and on a district-level representative sur-
vey of 500 households and 2,249 individu-
als conducted in 13 gram panchayats (GPs) 
of the district during July-August 2009.2 
The survey is representative at the district 
level and a comparison of means of varia-
bles which are available in our sample and 
the latest census supports the idea that the 
sample yields information that may be 
used to draw district-wide inferences 
( Table 1). 
Data from the survey is used to shed 
light on programme awareness, employ-
ment generated and the timing of 
e mployment generation. In addition to 
the survey, we draw on information gath-
ered from 70 individual job schemes lo-
cated in seven randomly selected GPs to 
analyse payment lags.    
Employment Generated:  
Access, Days and Timing 
To begin with, the panchayati raj institu-
tions (PRIs), in particular, the GPs appear 
to have been successful in raising pro-
gramme awareness. In all the survey are-
as, hoardings or painted boulders an-
nouncing the programme and/or details 
of the resources expended on a particular 
work scheme executed through the NREGS 
were prominently visible. More formally, 
based on survey responses, in terms of a 
rudimentary but essential indicator of 
awareness, 99.4% of surveyed households 
were aware of the existence of the NREGS 
and it was by far the best known govern-
ment programme in the district. For 
 example, only about 55-60% of surveyed 
households were aware of other social 
Table 1: Comparison of Means
Data Source Proportion of Males (%) Dependency Ratio Average Family Size Below Poverty Line Kuccha Dwellings (%)
Census 2001 51.29 1.70 4.6 42.3 63.8 
Sample (N=500) 50.69 1.75 4.5 43.5 63.8
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TISS-EPW Workshop on Exploratory Data Analysis
Using R Software and Internet Resources  
for Development Research
(December 6 to 11, 2010 at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai)
Economic & Political Weekly and the Tata Institute of Social Sciences are jointly organising a week-long workshop on Exploratory 
Data Analysis for Development Research during the week 6 to 11 December 2010 at the TISS campus in Mumbai.
This workshop is part of a University Grants Commission project to promote the social sciences in India.
The objective of the workshop is to provide practical guidance to researchers on the basic techniques of data analysis, on how 
to use the open source statistical software, “R”, for practising these techniques, and on how to utilise open resources available 
on the internet. 
The workshop is a short and intensive training programme meant for economic and social researchers on the use of exploratory 
data analysis (EDA) as a research tool for the analysis of quantitative data using R and internet resources.
R is a powerful software that is specifically designed for data exploration and it is free (downloadable from the internet). It is 
being increasingly used by academicians as well as those in business/commerce.
The resource persons will be experienced faculty from the National Institute of Public Finance, New Delhi, 
and the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
Who May Benefit
Researchers who need to make sense of quantitative data and those who work with primary survey data or published secondary 
data. 
Who Can Apply
The workshop will be open to teachers/researchers in universities and colleges under the age of 40 and any PhD scholar in a 
university/college working in the field of social sciences.
Requirements 
Participants should have done a course in basic/introductory statistics during their undergraduate/postgraduate degrees. They are 
expected to be familiar with elementary mathematics and with the basic statistical theory and applications as normally covered 
in a first level course in statistics for social scientists/economists. 
In addition, the participants must be conversant with at least a spreadsheet software such as Microsoft Excel and the use of 
standard browsers for internet use.
There will be a maximum of 20 participants in the workshop
Organization of the Workshop
The workshop will be six days of skill-intensive training. It will consist of short lectures, computer-based training in R, and, above 
all, extensive hands-on practice with data sets and internet resources. 
Lectures will aim to explain the basic philosophy, theory and techniques of EDA. The emphasis will be on underlying principles 
and applicability. The main aim is to acquaint participants with a new paradigm of data analysis through some of its most effective 
techniques. 
The computer training aims to familiarize participants with the use of R as well as use of the internet for research. Each computer 
session will begin with guided exercise, followed by a short assignment.
Travel and Accommodation
Travel costs of participants selected for the course will be covered as per UGC-TISS regulations. Participants will also be provided 
boarding and lodging on TISS campus during the duration of the course.
Application Process
Visit the EPW web site (http://epw.in or http://beta.epw.in/home/) for the application form.
Please send completed application forms preferably by email to: epw.tiss@gmail.com
Last Date for Submission of Forms: October 31
Selection of Participants: November 10
Postal Address: Saritha C.T, Assistant Professor, Room No.1, Director’s Office, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Deonar, 
Mumbai-88, (Phone: 022-25525193).
(If sending application by post, please write “Application for TISS-EPW Workshop on Exploratory Data Analysis” on 
the envelope.)
(Email and postal address are only for communication regarding the Workshop on Exploratory Data Analysis. Please do not 
send other correspondence to this address.)
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schemes such as the Indira Awas Yojana, a 
scheme for building houses for b elow 
 poverty line (BPL) households, and the 
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana, a 
scheme for assisting self-help groups, 
which have been in operation since 1985 
and 1999, respectively. In terms of infor-
mation source, the most common sources 
of information on the NREGS were the GPs 
(mentioned by 32% of the respondents) 
followed by individuals affiliated to a 
 political party (25%).
While the basic programme awareness 
is universal, knowledge on the details of 
the programme such as employment on 
demand, minimum wages, the right to 
 receive wage payments within a fortnight, 
the right to an unemployment allowance, 
and the right to information on all NREGA-
related documents is not as widespread. 
For example, 60% of those who had 
r eceived jobs through the NREGS were 
 unaware of the details of the payment 
pro cedure, none of the respondents 
had r eceived unemployment allowances, 
and only about 20% regularly attended 
Sansad and Gram Unnayan Samity (GUS) 
m eetings which are considered to be im-
portant platforms for public participation 
in the PRI.3  
Notwithstanding the limited awareness 
of programme details, in terms of its po-
tential to reach wide swathes of the rural 
population, the programme appears to be 
well-positioned. All households who had 
applied for a job card were able to obtain it 
without payment and without substantial 
delays. About 85% of surveyed households 
had job cards and amongst cardholders 
93.4% had applied for jobs. Unlike the 
case of Jharkhand, where Bhatia and 
Dreze (2006) report that government offi-
cials restricted job card access to BPL 
households and attempted to restrict the 
number of job cards issued in order to 
keep their workload under control, the 
 opposite pattern prevails in Birbhum. 
 Access to the job card is universal, and 
households regardless of their income sta-
tus have job cards. In the bulk of cases 
(71%) the job cards were with the families 
and were shown to the survey team. For 
14% the cards were with the job supervi-
sors or with local officials such as the sec-
retary of the GUS or the panchayat office, 
presumably for data entry purposes. We 
scrutinised 70 cards in detail and in 64 of 
these the data were complete. The name 
of the working scheme, the signature of 
the paymaster, the number of days worked, 
the time of the year when the work was 
carried out and payments made were all 
clearly noted and provided on the card. 
In terms of employment issues, the bulk 
of the job applicants (68.4%) mentioned 
that they did not apply for a job them-
selves but they were asked to do so by the 
panchayat or by the GUS. While one may 
a pplaud the proactiveness of PRI in terms 
of promoting job access, the pattern also 
suggests that the notion of employment on 
demand has not taken root, despite three 
years of programme operation. This is a 
point to which we will return later on in 
the text. 
Turning to employment generation, 
amongst the applicants, 96% of households 
had received jobs through the programme 
for at least one day since the programme 
inception. While this is impressive, the 
quantity of employment generated is not 
particularly overwhelming. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, for the state as a whole, over the 
three-year period, the number of job-days 
created is very low as compared to the 
 legally mandated number of days. 
Although the number of job-days creat-
ed increases from 14 in 2006-07 to 26 in 
2008-09, it remains well below the 100- 
day mark and also well below the national 
average of about 50 days. As far as Birb-
hum is concerned, a similar pattern 
emerges, that is, about 21 to 30 days have 
been created per year. 
By itself the generation of a small 
number of job-days in the context of an 
employment on demand programme may 
not be remarkable. The more pertinent 
question is whether jobs have not been 
generated despite demand or whether 
these jobs have not been created as PRIs 
have not been able to meet the demand for 
work. According to a recent article in the 
press, an official dealing with the NREGS in 
West Bengal points out that one of the 
 major reasons for the lack of employment 
days generated is the lack of demand for 
jobs (Williams 2009). In contrast to this 
statement, our field experiences and 
 responses to questions in the survey instru-
ment clearly display that at the prevailing 
wage rate of about Rs 80 a day, there is a 
clear demand for NREGS work. While 
 respondents may not apply for work, this 
should not be interpreted as a lack of 
 demand, but as a sign of being discouraged 
due to the lack of responsiveness of the im-
plementing agencies responsible for man-
aging the scheme. T able 3 shows that the 
number of annual desired days of work 
through the NREGS is 204, while the days 
actually created are about 20 per year. 
There is substantial variation in job crea-
tion across GPs with the best performing 
ones creating about three times more jobs 
than the laggards. Clearly, the gap across 
GPs deserves attention, and further analy-
sis to identify the reasons for the wide vari-
ation in employment generation.
The lean season in the district’s agricul-
tural and economic cycle is between mid-
August and the end of November (Bhaddro-
Ashwin-Kartick) (see Mukherjee 1995). 
This period is characterised by a scarcity 
Table 2: Average Person Days Worked Conditional on Applying for a Job 
 Annual Average Person Days of Work, Annual Average Person Days of Annual Average Person Days of  
 West Bengal  Work, Birbhum Work,  Birbhum
2006-07 14.27 21.45 18.7
2007-08 25.21 30.53 21.5
2008-09 26.00 31.22 21.6
Number of projects   395
Sources: Data in columns 1 and 2 are from www.nrega.nic.in. Data in column 3 is from the authors’ household survey. 
Table 3: Need  for and Provision of Work in Various 
Panchayat Areas
Gram Panchayat  Annual Average Annual Average 
(Number of Households) Person Days of  Person Days of 
 Work-Generated Work-Desired
Khoyrasole (32) 30.95 177.78
Panrui (24) 28.25 157.22
Kundala (38) 27.66 197.13
Parulia (33) 27.14 213
Harisara (40) 26.92 201.13
Bahiri Panch Soya (48) 23.74 231.73
Rupuspur (29) 17.12 245.31
Gonpur (20) 15.26 168.65
Joydeb (27) 13.34 216.78
Barrah (25) 13.13 219.4
Mollarpur-II (27) 9.876 249.54
Ulkunda (27) 9.356 185.07
Bajitpur (25) 9.086 159.63
Total (395) 20.43 203.84
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of livelihood opportunities due to the dry-
ing up of agricultural activities. House-
holds cope with this situation through 
temporary migration and by selling dura-
ble possessions including livestock and 
utensils. Typically, the occasional work 
available during this period does not en-
sure a steady source of income. Based on 
data recorded in job cards as well as re-
sponses to survey questions, a clear picture 
of the pattern of work through the NREGS 
and non-NREGS sources may be construct-
ed. Over the three-year period under scru-
tiny, we see that on a verage during the 
roughly 105-day lean period, sample house-
holds generated 46 days of work (across all 
household mem bers). The bulk of this 
work, about 90% was generated from non-
NREGS sources (see Tables 4a and 4b). 
 A clear signal of the lack of opportuni-
ties is the extremely low average daily 
wage earned from non-NREGS jobs during 
this period (about Rs 29 in 2008-09), while 
the average wage rate earned from NREGS 
jobs was substantially higher at Rs 83 in 
2008-09. In 2008-09, about 3.4 days or 
roughly 15% of the NREGS employment 
days were generated during the lean period 
(about 28% of the year) displaying that not 
only does the program me generate very 
few job-days, but that it is by no means 
generating proportionately more opportu-
nities when alternatives are scarce. 
The predominant work under the NREGS 
is related to digging of ponds and other 
earth works and during the lean period 
such opportunities are also scarce. As 
shown in Table 5, the bulk of the projects, 
close to 87%, are to do with excavating or 
re-excavating ponds. Such work is hard to 
perform during the rainy season, mid-July 
to mid-October, and this period also c overs 
the bulk of the lean season. While it may be 
possible to execute other types of work dur-
ing this period, based on our i nvestigation 
there seemed to be an a bsence of a proper 
shelf of schemes and a lack of ideas on 
what new schemes could be d eveloped. 
A similar picture emerges from an 
 analysis of information on employment-
days and expenditure obtained from the 
 district office. As depicted in Figures 1 
and 2, both person-days generated and 
expenditure increase gradually from the 
beginning to the end of the fiscal year 
(1 April to 31 March).
Expenditures and person-days generat-
ed increase sharply towards the end of 
each fiscal year, suggesting a pressure from 
higher tiers of government to spend mon-
ey. In contrast, when there is a real need 
for creation of jobs, especially in the lean 
period, there is no discernible i ncrease in 
spending or job creation p atterns. While 
the district clearly lags b ehind in terms of 
employment generated, a noteworthy 
point is that consistent with the provisions 
of the NREGA, information pertaining to 
the operation of the scheme appeared to be 
well-maintained, was readily accessible 
and made available to the researchers 
without excuses and on demand. 
Wages: Rates and Lags
As shown in Tables 4a and 4b, regardless 
of the season – lean or non-lean – in 2008-
09 the average daily wage in the case of 
NREGS jobs was about Rs 83. In contrast, 
the average wage during the lean season 
in non-NREGS jobs was Rs 29, while during 
the non-lean season at Rs 158 a day, wages 
in non-NREGS jobs were substantially 
higher than in the NREGS jobs. Prima facie, 
these data suggest that during the non-
lean  season, given the level of the NREGS 
wage, the scheme is unlikely to crowd out 
private employment. Furthermore, even 
Table 4a: Employment and Wages during the ‘Lean Season’ – Mid-August to End-November 
 Non-NREGS NREGS
Year Work Days  Total Wage (Rs)  Wage Per Working Day (Rs)  Work Days  Total Wage (Rs) Wage Per Working Day (Rs)
2006-07 41.76 826.01 19.78 5.25 361.2 68.80
2007-08 42.71 984.89 23.06 3.55 264.83 74.60
2008-09 42.12 1,221.48 29 3.41 281.49 82.55
Table 4b: Employment and Wages during the ‘Non-Lean Season’*
 Non-NREGS NREGS
Year Work Days  Total Wage (Rs)  Wage Per Working Day (Rs)  Work Days  Total Wage (Rs) Wage Per Working Day (Rs)
2006-07 – – – 13.45 976.79 72.62
2007-08 – – – 17.95 1,567.41 87.32
2008-09 142.07 22,486.32 158.27 18.19 1,507.26 82.86
* Whole year (1 April to 31 March) except the period from mid-August to end-November.
Table 5: Type of Work Performed since Inception  
of NREGS (%)
Work Type 
Re-excavation of pond 86.8
Digging irrigation channel 3.68
Village roads/rural connectivity 2.63
Social forestry 0.26
Nursery and sapling  0.79
Land shaping and land development 5.79
Flood control 0.00
Number of projects 395
 
Figure 1: Month-wise Employment Generated under NREGS for Birbhum District
Source: Office of the District Nodal Officer, NREGS, Birbhum District, Government of West Bengal.
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Figure 2: Month-wise Expenditure  on NREGS for Birbhum District 
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during the lean season, given the small 
number of work-days generated through 
the NREGS, it is unlikely that it crowds out 
private employment. 
Under the NREGA, workers are entitled 
to wage payments every week and in any 
case within a fortnight of the commence-
ment of work. To identify payment lags 
and to pinpoint the source of the bottle-
neck, we gathered information on 70 ran-
domly chosen individual work schemes lo-
cated in seven randomly selected GPs. Be-
fore turning to a discussion of the findings, 
it should be pointed out that we were able 
to access NREGS-related information with-
out any hindrance. The information gath-
ered to follow the wage payment chain 
was culled from various records main-
tained by the GP and all seven GPs records 
were readily available and a ppeared to be 
updated and systematically maintained. 
Based on the 70 schemes that we studied, 
only in six cases (all from a single GP) 
was the required information not well- 
recorded. Computerisation of records 
started from the middle of 2008 and the 
information that the team gathered is 
based on the information contained in reg-
isters as well as electronic records. 
To trace the overall lag between com-
mencement of work to date of payment 
and to identify the source of the delay, the 
following dates were recorded for each of 
the 70 schemes:
(1) Date of Start of Work: The date on 
which the work commences with a mini-
mum number of workers (source: scheme’s 
register). 
(2) Date of First Measurement: The date 
on which the technical personnel from the 
GP measures physical output of work done 
after the first round of work (source: 
measurement book/sheet).
 
(3) Date of Muster Roll Preparation: 
The date on which the clerical work is 
 undertaken to convert the physical out-
put of work into monetary equivalent on 
the basis of the schedule of rates. The 
muster roll lists names of workers with 
corresponding physical output of work 
and the monetary equivalent that needs 
to be paid out to each worker (source: 
muster roll files).
(4) Date of Advance Payment/Payment 
Advice Sent to Bank/Post Office for 
Payment: After preparation of muster 
roll, the amount of money to be paid as 
wages is drawn as an advance (before the 
introduction of the institutional payment 
system) by the gram panchayat officials 
from the gram panchayat’s bank account 
or the officials send a payment advice for 
each worker to the disbursing bank or post 
office (after the introduction of the insti-
tutional payments system) (source: gram 
panchayat advance register).
(5) Date of Payment: The exact date on 
which payments have been made or 
r eceived in accounts. This date can be 
traced from the job cards or bank/post 
o ffice account pass books of workers.
After tracing these dates from various 
registers, we defined the measurement 
lag as the time gap between date of start 
of work and the date of first measure-
ment, the muster roll lag as the time gap 
b etween date of first measurement and 
date of m uster roll preparation, and fi-
nally, the d isbursement lag as the time 
gap between the date of muster roll prep-
aration and date of payment. The total 
lag is the lag between date of start of work 
and date of payment. 
As displayed in Table 6, in 2006-07, on 
average, the time gap between work 
i nception and payments was about 42 
days. Over time, the delays have declined 
in 2007-08 to 24 days, and in 2008-09, 
they fell to 20 days. Thus, while delays 
still persist, they are not as egregious as 
they were during the first year of the pro-
gramme. The main delay in the process 
occurs between measurement and the 
preparation of the muster roll. The rea-
sons for the delay at this stage of the wage 
payment chain call for an additional scru-
tiny, as potentially, at least in the case of 
the system of cash payments, this stage 
may be most susceptible to diversion of 
funds through the creation of inflated or 
fake muster roll entries. Similar concerns 
are raised by Adhikari and Bhatia (2010) 
in the context of their study in Allahabad 
and Ranchi districts. 
Concluding Remarks
This article scrutinises selected aspects of 
the functioning of the NREGS in Birbhum 
district of West Bengal. The analysis 
shows that, in Birbhum, there is universal 
awareness about the NREGS, job cards 
have been made available to all those who 
have a pplied and NREGS-related informa-
tion is well-maintained and relatively ac-
cessible. While there were long delays in 
wage p ayments during the first year of the 
programme, since then, the payment lag 
has declined and it is now in the range of 
20 days. While this delay is not consistent 
with the provisions of the Act, it is a clear 
improvement from the 42-day lag obser-
ved in the first year. 
Notwithstanding these positive aspects, 
with respect to one of the main goals of the 
Act, that is, the provision of work when al-
ternative employment opportunities are 
scarce, the NREGS is not fulfilling its role. 
The total number of employment days gen-
erated is about 20% of the legally mandat-
ed minimum and the days that are created 
are not more likely to be generated during 
the agricultural lean season. Indeed, the 
main concern in the case of Birbhum as in 
the case of the state is the limited capacity 
to generate employment. There is a need 
for an innovative thinking on how to use 
the available resources to create jobs and 
c onstruct useful rural infrastructure. F ocus-
ing, as in the case of Birbhum, only on exca-
vation and re-excavation of ponds is unlike-
ly to lead to the development of useful rural 
infrastructure or sustain job creation. 
Notes
1  www.nrega.nic.in
2  The household survey  was conducted by a team 
of 13 students enrolled in a MA/MPhil pro-
grammes in Economics and Rural Development 
Department at Visva-Bharati University, San-
tiniketan and was led by the first author. The sur-
vey was designed to be representative at the dis-
trict level and in the first stage the gram panchay-
ats were stratified into three strata according to 
their degree of development. Subsequently, 
households were randomly drawn from each of 
these three strata. The proportion of surveyed 
households from each strata matches their share 
in the population. Additional details on the sur-
vey design are available in Dey (2010).
3  The aim of a Gram Unnayan Samity or a village de-
velopment committee, which consists of elected lo-
cal officials and members of NGOs and self-help 
groups amongst others, is to ensure active partici-
pation of village residents in the implementation 
and distribution of benefits of social p rogrammes. 
Table 6: Payment Lags in Days
Year Measurement Muster Roll Disbursement Total Lag
 Lag Lag Lag
2006-07 9.87 29.00 2.80 41.67
2007-08 6.95 3.32 13.86 24.14
2008-09 8.61 10.67 0.94 20.22
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Call for Research Pre-Proposals – Economics of Environmental Changes
Deadline: December 15th 2010
The South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE) is a regional 
network that brings together and strengthens South Asian researchers and institutions interested in the inter-
connections between development and the environment. SANDEE invites you to submit research pre-proposals 
on the economics of climate change, urban environmental management and other relevant environmental 
issues in South Asia. Multi-disciplinary and multi-country research projects with appropriate methodological 
innovations are highly encouraged. Pre-proposals, if accepted, will lead to an invitation to submit a full research 
proposal.
1. Economics of Climate Change
South Asian economies need to develop a variety of strategies to adapt to climate change and reduce their 
own green house gas emissions. Thus, SANDEE is soliciting proposals in two areas: a) Policy reforms and 
market instruments for low carbon growth.  What market and policy instruments can be used to reduce green 
house gas emissions? What are the co-benefits of local pollution and green house gas reduction strategies?  
What are the costs of shifting to new energy technologies? What are the bottlenecks to using global instruments 
such as REDD and carbon markets? b) The benefits, costs and distributional impacts of specific adaptation 
strategies. What is the economic viability of ‘adaptation instruments’ such as insurance, improved natural 
barriers or institutional responses?   What are some benefits and costs of adaptation?
2. Economics of Environmental Management
Dirty water, solid waste, toxic chemicals, and indoor and outdoor air pollution have serious implications for human 
health and productivity.  Most South Asian countries have laws to regulate pollution but these are not well 
implemented. How do we design appropriate policies and strategies to improve municipal solid waste management? 
How effective are current waste management and recycling regulations? What policy instruments (taxes, subsidies, 
bans, user-fees, campaigns etc.) are successful in reducing congestion, strengthening safe disposal of toxic waste, 
and improving air and water quality? What are the distributional outcomes associated with environmental policy 
instruments? How do we account for environmental costs in designing economic policies? 
In addition to the above two priority areas, SANDEE will accept proposals related to natural resource use 
and management. Research proposals can be in the form of case studies, analytical work based on secondary 
or primary data or theoretical examinations. Primary investigators should have prior training in economics at 
the Masters or PhD level and pre-proposals that do not have a strong economics component will not be 
considered. Institutional affiliation is required for receiving support. Pre-proposals will be evaluated on their 
academic merit and policy significance. 
SANDEE will collect proposals throughout the next 12 months. However, in order to be considered for the 
summer 2011 round of research competition, please send concept notes by December 15th 2010. Grants 
size is on average 20,000 USD for a one to two year period. Larger budgets are considered if a multidisciplinary 
research team of natural and social scientists are involved with a clear definition of roles and tasks. Detailed 
guidelines are provides on SANDEE’s website. Concept notes must be uploaded on SANDEE’s website at 
www.sandeeonline.com. Please contact us at info@sandeeonline.org, if you have additional queries. 
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Scheduled Areas Need a Fresh 
Legal Perspective
Sanjay Upadhyay
The Panchayats (Extension to the 
Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 and 
the Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers Act of 
2006 offer a great opportunity to 
provide equitable governance in 
tribal-dominated backward areas. 
But these laws are skeletons and 
need the flesh and sinews of 
operational rules and guidelines, 
removal of legal incongruencies 
to ensure a dignified tribal life 
and awareness campaigns on 
self-governance and community 
control over natural resources.
The recent remarks by Digvijay Singh, senior Congress leader on the root cause of insurgency, the 
concurrence of another senior Congress-
man Mani Shankar Aiyar and more 
i mportantly, the non-implementation of 
the Panchayats (Extension to the Sched-
uled A reas) Act, 1996 (PESA) raise the 
 pertinent issue of constitutional obliga-
tions on the part of the states with sched-
uled areas. The primary reasons of unrest 
have not been addressed in the insurgency-
infested, forest rich, mineral abundant and 
sadly, poverty stricken scheduled areas of 
India. The PESA was enacted with very lit-
tle d ebate or media attention 14 years ago 
in 1996. It offered a huge opportunity to 
turn the tables in the scheduled areas 
where self-governance and community 
control over resources were key to em-
powering the marginalised forest dwell-
ing communities who may be silent wit-
nesses to the violence due to helplessness. 
The scheduled areas and the other tribal- 
dominated areas also got a shot in the arm 
with the recently enacted Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwell-
ers Act of 2006 (FRA) which aims not only 
to undo historical injustice to the above 
two categories of people but also man-
dates that security of tenure is key to inte-
grating the forest dwelling scheduled 
tribes and other traditional forest dwell-
ers who are dependent on the forest for 
their livelihoods and for strengthening of 
the conservation regime. 
 What the above two tribal welfare legis-
lations along with the Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atroc-
ities) Act, 1989 raise, is a larger constitu-
tional mandate which seems to be long 
forgotten: the creation and administra-
tion of scheduled areas (erstwhile partial-
ly excluded areas, excluded and tribal ar-
eas). These special areas of administration 
were deliberated upon by the Constitution 
makers through three subcommittees at 
the time of independence.1 The distilled 
vision on how to manage such areas 
r esulted in the creation of scheduled areas 
with specific provisions for administering 
scheduled areas especially through a 
d etailed constitutional mandate. 
Unworkable Approach 
The priorities of the State and its reluc-
tance to devolve power along with the 
competitiveness of economic develop-
ment, are gradually eroding the very edi-
fice on which state structure is built – the 
village assembly. This is more visible in ar-
eas that are predominantly inhabited by 
the tribal communities and which are re-
mote, inaccessible and therefore largely 
excluded in the current growth model. 
Not surprisingly, these areas are cotermi-
nus with the scheduled areas throughout 
the plains in India and more particular in 
central India. 
Further, the government has to this date 
followed only a schematic and program-
matic approach of handing out largesse, pri-
marily to integrate the marginalised tribal 
communities into the clichéd mainstream. 
The schematic approach to such areas cou-
pled with inadequate action on self empow-
erment without giving r egard to the cus-
toms, traditions and the special relationship 
with land has not worked and therefore 
needs to be corrected immediately. A new 
